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Abstract:
William Black’s (2005) control fraud theory suggests accounting fraud initiated by CEOs
is more damaging than accounting fraud that is not. However, this theory has only been applied
anecdotally to financial institutions. I test Black’s theory using a sample of manufacturing,
merchandising, and service firms that engaged in accounting fraud from 2007-2014. I
hypothesize that firms which commit CEO-led fraud will exhibit greater growth, leverage, and
have higher CEO compensation. My findings do not show that there is any evidence that control
frauds are more damaging than other accounting frauds that do not involve the CEO.
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Introduction:
William Black’s control fraud theory suggest that accounting fraud that is directed by the
CEO causes greater damage to the firm than fraud that is not 1. The CEO position enables them
to utilize their firms as a vehicle for fraud, allowing them to override both internal and external
controls, as well as convert firm assets into personal payments through regular corporate
mechanisms2. Because of the normalcy of these CEO actions, control fraud oftentimes goes
undetected until it is too late, causing great harm to the firm and those associated with it. This
has been evident over the last decade, especially during the economic recession of 2008. The
fraudulent financial firms involved during this time exhibited most or all of the four factors
Black commonly identifies with control fraud: extreme leverage, lending to un-creditworthy
borrowers, extreme growth, and minimal loss reserves 3. These characteristics can be used to
help identify fraud within the financial industry.
This research tests Black’s theory using firms that Black does not include in his theory:
nonfinancial firms, such as manufacturing, merchandising, and service firms. To my knowledge,
Black’s theory has only been applied anecdotally to the financial industry, so my research sought
to find a correlation between his theory and non-financial firms. This could open up the
application of Black’s theory to identify fraud within non-financial firms as well.

1

Black, William K. "Epidemics of 'Control Fraud' Lead to Recurrent, Intensifying Bubbles and Crises." SSRN
Electronic Journal SSRN Journal (2010): n. pag. ScienceDirect. Web. 18 Sept. 2015.
2

Black, William K. "“Control Frauds” as Financial Super-predators: How “pathogens” Make Financial Markets
Inefficient." The Journal of Socio-Economics 34.6 (2005): 734-55. ScienceDirect. Web. 12 Nov. 2015.
3

Black, “Epidemics of ‘Control Fraud’ pg.17.
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Methodology:
Based on Black’s control fraud theory I hypothesized that control fraud firms would
exhibit the following: more extreme grow rates, higher leverage rates, and higher CEO
compensation in the form of base salary, bonuses, and stock options. Because control fraud
compares accounting fraud led by the CEO to those that aren’t, I decided to use a logistic
regression model to test my hypotheses, using a binary dependent variable of (1) the CEO is
documented as orchestrating the control fraud, and (0), otherwise. My variables of interest were
based on my hypotheses, and included the firms’ growth rates over the period the fraud occurred,
their leverage rates, and CEO compensation in the form of changes in base salary, bonuses, and
stock options.
To calculate my variables of interest, I collected a sample of firms from the Securities
and Exchange Commissions Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases. From the 2007
through 2015 archives, I searched through each release for companies that committed accounting
fraud beginning in 2007 or later. In order to determine whether accounting fraud had been
committed, I specifically looked for violations of SEC rules 10(b),10b-5, 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and
13(b)(2)(B). From these releases I collected information such as the company involved. the year
the fraud began, and whether the CEO was involved or not. Because my research focused on
applying Black’s theory to nonfinancial firms, I eliminated all companies in the financial
industry from my sample.
After gathering my sample, I used the SEC’s Edgar® search tool to access each
company’s proxy statements (Form DEF 14a) for the year beginning of and year prior to the
fraud. The proxy statements provided me with CEO compensation data in the form of base pay,
stock options, and bonuses for the relevant years. I also used Standard and Poor’s Research
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Insight database, which provides financial statement material such as the income statement,
balance sheet, and cash flows from both active and inactive publicly traded companies. This
database gave me information such as the company’s total assets, total equity, total debt, and net
income. I then compiled all of the data I had collected into an Excel spreadsheet, and eliminated
from my sample any firms within the financial industry, as well as those whose necessary
financial information was unavailable from my sample, which resulted in a sample size of 65
companies.
Using the data that I had gathered, I computed each firm’s growth and leverage rate for
the year prior to and beginning of the fraud. Growth was measured by the change in current
assets over total assets, as well as change in net income, while leverage was measured by the
percentage of total debt to total assets, and total debt to total equity. I then compiled these
calculations, along with the CEO compensation data I had collected and a column specifying my
binary dependent variable, into a different Excel spreadsheet. This spreadsheet was then
imported into IBM’s SPSS® software to run the logistic regression model.

Results:
A logistic regression model was utilized because I had a dichotomous dependent variable,
with multiple independent variables. Logistic regression models predict any significance in the
relationships between the dependent variable and independent variables.
I ran multiple logistic regression models in SPSS using my dependent variable and
different combinations of five control variables at a time, which enabled me to compare levels of
significance with each independent variable. Figure 1 summarizes the results of one of the
logistic regression models I ran, using the firms’ leverage rates for the year the fraud began, their
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growth rates measured by the change in net income from the year prior to and beginning of the
fraud, and their CEO compensation in the form of base pay, stock options, and bonuses from the
year the fraud began. Using this combination of variables resulted in no significance.
Variables in the Equation
B
S.E.
Wald
Step 1

a

Total Debt/Total
Equity: Y0
Change in Net
Income: from Y-1 to
Y0
Stock Options: CY
Base Pay: CY
Bonuses: CY
Constant

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

.000

.001

.246

1

.620

1.000

.001

.001

.814

1

.367

1.001

.000
.000
.000
-.344

.000
.000
.000
.387

.693
.020
.176
.792

1
1
1
1

.405
.888
.674
.373

1.000
1.000
1.000
.709

Figure 1 – Y0 and CY signifies the year the fraud began, Y-1 the year prior.

To further test the existence of significance, I ran another logistic regression model using
different control variables. Figure 2 below summarizes the results, in which I chose to look at the
firms’ leverage rates for the year prior to the fraud, their growth rates measured as the change
from the two years prior and the year prior to the beginning of the fraud, and their current year
CEO compensation methods.
Variables in the Equation
B
S.E.
Wald
Step 1

a

Total Debt/Total
Assets: Y-1
Change in Assets:
from Y-2 to Y-1
Stock Options: CY
Base Pay: CY
Bonuses: CY
Constant

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

.000

.001

.206

1

.650

1.000

-.003

.005

.266

1

.606

.997

.000
.000
.000
-.203

.000
.000
.000
.489

.456
.059
.297
.172

1
1
1
1

.500
.808
.586
.679

1.000
1.000
1.000
.816

Figure 2 – Y0 and CY signifies the year the fraud began, Y-1 the year prior, and Y-2 two years prior

.
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Just like the first model I ran, I was not able to find any significance using this set of variables.
Based on the results of the two logistic regression models I ran, there is no significance between
the companies’ growth and leverage rates and CEO compensations, and CEO involvement in the
fraud.

Discussion:
Although Black’s control fraud theory indicates that accounting frauds involving the
CEO exhibit greater growth and leverage rates, as well as higher CEO compensation than those
that do not have CEO involvement, my research findings do not support this. Though these
results are unexpected, there are some limitations of my research that could have skewed them.
After eliminating firms that did not meet the requirements, my sample consisted of 65 firms.
There is the possibility that the sample size is not sufficiently large enough to test Black’s theory,
thus the lack of significance found is not an accurate representation of its application. To my
knowledge there has been no further application of his theory other than anecdotally, so very
little corroboration for my results exists. If this research was to be continued, expanding the
years from which the companies were collected would provide a bigger sample size, which could
lead to significant results.
The methods of valuation for certain assets differ between financial institutions that
Black initially applies his theory to and manufacturing, merchandising, and service firms that I
include in my sample, which could have contributed to the lack of significance in the
characteristics that he theorized would vary between control-fraud firms and other fraudulent
firms. Two reasons why finance sectors tend to be more fraudulent are the absence of effective
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regulation and the investing in assets that lack a readily verifiable value4. The type of assets
commonly held by financial institutions include loans, investments, and mortgages; in
determining values these assets do not follow the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles as
others such as land, equipment, and buildings do, but typically rely on the judgment of thirdparty evaluators. This provides top management an opportunity to exert influence and control
over third-parties through coercion in order to receive more favorable, yet fraudulent asset
valuations5. Such opportunities for fraud are less common in nonfinancial industries such as the
manufacturing, merchandising, and service firms included in my sample, and could contribute to
the lack of significance in my model. If this research was to be continued, I would recommend
future researchers include both financial and nonfinancial firms in the sample size and compare
significance between the two in order to further test Black’s theory.

Conclusion:
Black’s control fraud theory states that accounting fraud led by the CEO is more
damaging that fraud that is not; however, his theory has only been anecdotally applied to
financial firms. This research sought to test the applicability of his theory to nonfinancial firms
using a logistic regression model. I hypothesized that control fraudulent firms would exhibit
greater growth, greater leverage, and higher CEO compensations. My research did not find any
significance, thus does not support Black’s theory when applied to nonfinancial firms. Further
research using a wider sample size or financial industries may result in significant results.
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